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Abstract
Many recent studies have shown that deep neural models are vulnerable to ad-
versarial samples: images with imperceptible perturbations, for example, can
fool image classifiers. In this paper, we generate adversarial examples for ob-
ject detection, which entails detecting bounding boxes around multiple objects
present in the image and classifying them at the same time, making it a harder
task than against image classification. We specifically aim to attack the widely
used Faster R-CNN by changing the predicted label for a particular object in
an image: where prior work has targeted one specific object (a stop sign), we
generalise to arbitrary objects, with the key challenge being the need to change
the labels of all bounding boxes for all instances of that object type. To do
so, we propose a novel method, named Pick-Object-Attack. Pick-Object-
Attack successfully adds perturbations only to bounding boxes for the targeted
object, preserving the labels of other detected objects in the image. In terms
of perceptibility, the perturbations induced by the method are very small. Fur-
thermore, for the first time, we examine the effect of adversarial attacks on
object detection in terms of a downstream task, image captioning; we show that
where a method that can modify all object types leads to very obvious changes
in captions, the changes from our constrained attack are much less apparent.
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1. Introduction
Deep learning systems have achieved remarkable success for several com-
puter vision tasks. However, adversarial attacks have brought into question the
robustness of such systems. Goodfellow et al. [1] and Szegedy et al. [2] pre-
sented early attacks against image classifiers, using gradient-based techniques to
construct inputs with the ability to fool deep learning systems. Since then ad-
versarial attacks have been extensively studied for image classification, including
being shown to be transferable across different image classifiers [3]. These at-
tacks are usually categorised into two types (i) Targeted and (ii) Non-targeted.
In a targeted attack, the goal is to modify the input so as to make the deep
learning system predict a specific class, whereas in a non-targeted attack, the
input is modified so as to cause the prediction of any incorrect class.
A more challenging task is to construct adversarial examples that will fool
an object detection system, with each image containing multiple objects and
multiple proposals for each object; Xie et al. [4] provide an analysis of this com-
plexity. Chen et al. [5] motivate this task with the example of object detection
by an autonomous vehicle to recognise a stop sign and the risks involved in an
adversarial attack in that context.
These two works tackle the issue of adversarial attacks against object detec-
tion and are the most relevant to our work. Xie et al. [4] propose a non-targeted
attack where the predictions of all objects are changed simultaneously. Chen et
al. [5] propose an attack against the object detector to misclassify only stop sign
images; the attack method deliberately adds perceptible noise to the images.
In this paper, the proposed Pick-Object-Attack aims to change the la-
bel of a particular object while keeping the labels of other detected objects
unchanged. In this sense, it is a generalisation of Chen et al. [5], where there
may be a particular object that the attacker wants to be misclassified. More
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Figure 1: Example of our adversarial attack. Pick-Object-Attack adds imperceptible per-
turbations to the first image (on the left) resulting in the second image (on the right). It
succeeds in changing the predicted class of the targeted object from “sign” to “flowers” (shown
in orange) while other predicted classes (shown in blue) are unchanged.
generally, it is often a goal of adversarial attacks to be imperceptible to ob-
servers; attacking just a single object, with the small number of bounding boxes
involved, minimises the changes to the image relative to modifying all the ob-
jects as in Xie et al. [4]. Moreover, changes to the image — even if imperceptible
to humans — could be perceptible via downstream tasks. For instance, object
detection plays a crucial role in the state-of-the-art visual question answering
(VQA) and image captioning systems [6]. Changing the entire image may lead
to dramatically different answers or captions and hence alert the user indirectly.
Figure 1 shows an example of our proposed Pick-Object-Attack. From the
figure, we can see that only the label of object type “sign” has changed to
“flowers” whereas other objects are detected correctly. This is because the per-
turbation is only added to the bounding boxes with the predicted label “sign”.
In this paper, we propose both targeted and non-targeted versions of Pick-
Object-Attack against Faster R-CNN [7], a widely used and high-performing
object detector. Chen et al. [5] and Xie et al. [4] studied a version of Faster
R-CNN trained on the COCO dataset [8]. In this work, we use Faster R-CNN
trained on the Visual Genome dataset [9] which includes a larger set of classes
in comparison with the COCO dataset. Bottom-up features obtained from
this version of Faster R-CNN have been employed in state-of-the-art VQA and
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image captioning systems [6]. These systems use the bottom-up and top-down
attention to attend to the bounding boxes in order to generate a caption (or an
answer).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (i) This is the first study
to successfully apply both targeted and non-targeted attacks against Faster R-
CNN on different types of images. Xie et al. [4] only study the non-targeted
attack against Faster R-CNN and Chen et al. [5] only attack stop sign images.
(ii) This is the first work which studies an adversarial attack against Faster
R-CNN in a constrained setting where only pixels within a specified object type
are changed. Our proposed attack changes the label of a particular object in
an image while preserving the labels of other detected objects. We propose an
attack which works for arbitrary images and can be straightforwardly generalised
to change the labels of multiple detected objects. (iii) Despite the constrained
setting, the proposed attack achieves high success rates for both targeted (>
75%) and non-targeted (> 95%) attacks. We show that the proposed attack
adds imperceptible perturbation to the image. (iv) This is the first work to study
the effect of attacking Faster R-CNN on the state-of-the-art image captioning
system [6] which uses bottom-up, object-based features. We show that it leads
to many fewer changes in captions than a method based on Xie et al. [4] which
modifies all the objects.
2. Related work
In this section, we give a brief overview on adversarial attack for different
vision tasks and discuss related work on adversarial attack against Faster R-
CNN in detail.
2.1. Adversarial Attack
The generation of adversarial samples was first investigated in the context
of deep learning by Szegedy et al. [2], who used a gradient-based optimization
to arbitrarily manipulate the input sample of a deep neural network for im-
age classification. This manipulation usually aims to find similar samples with
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differences that are imperceptible to human observers, in order to change the
predicted class. Later works [10, 11, 12, 1, 13, 14, 15] have led to better methods
for generating adversarial samples, using different proposed attack mechanisms,
to mislead different classification models. In addition to classification, adversar-
ial samples have also been crafted for other tasks such as image captioning [16].
They studied earlier image captioning models [17, 18] which use features from
image classifiers. Here, two types of adversarial examples, targeted keyword and
targeted caption, are created using an optimization-based method. The exam-
ples can induce image captioning systems to generate pre-defined keywords or
captions.
Moreover, adversarial samples have been developed for physical world sce-
narios where, for example, the printed versions of the samples are used to attack
deep learning classification models [19, 20, 21]. These approaches, like almost
all other work, focus on attacking whole image classification rather than object
detection, and this has been the case in both the machine learning and security
communities [22]. Proposed defences also illustrate the focus on whole image
classification [23, 24, 25]. For example, PixelDP was proposed as a certified de-
fence approach — referring to a high-robustness model against norm-bounded
adversarial attacks — which can be scaled up to large networks and datasets
[24]. Defensive distillation [25] was proposed as a defense to counter saliency
map based adversarial attack against image classification [26], training a second
network using the soft labels obtained from the first network. To analyse the
effectivness of this and other defences, Ling et al. [27] proposed DEEPSEC as a
security analysis platform including a collection of adversarial attacks, defences
and their corresponding metrics, again with a focus on image classification.
However, in many scenarios including the physical world, we usually face
multiple objects in an image. Under such a condition, an attack would be
required to fool an object detector, which detects the bounding boxes of objects
in addition to classifying them. Eykholt et al. [20] discussed that misleading
an object detector, such as YOLO [28] and Faster R-CNN [7], is more difficult
than misleading an image classifier.
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In this paper, we attack Faster R-CNN, which is a highly-cited and high-
performing system for object detection. It has been recently used for different
important purposes such as object tracking and segmentation [29, 30], action
detection and classification in video [31], image captioning and visual question
answering [6, 32] and so forth. We focus on both targeted and non-targeted
attacks to mislead Faster R-CNN. Although the possibility of a black-box at-
tack, i.e., no access to the parameters of the model to be attacked, has been
investigated in the literature [33], we assume that our attack method has access
to the parameters (white-box attack). For the first time, we also examine the
impact of our proposed attacks on the state-of-the-art image captioning system
[6].
2.2. Adversarial Attack against Faster R-CNN
Faster R-CNN consists of two stages, a region proposal network (RPN) for
detecting the bounding boxes of objects, and a classifier for classifying the boxes
[7]. Let Iorg be an input image with a number (N) of detected bounding boxes,
{h1, h2, . . . , hN} where hi is represented by four coordinates. Although the RPN
can generate a dynamic number of bounding boxes from the image, an upper
bound is usually set on the number of bounding boxes ranked by their confi-
dence levels. The confidence level of each bounding box is calculated using the
objectness score and non-maximum suppression (NMS). The RPN predicts an
objectness score indicating the probability of an object being present inside the
box and the NMS threshold reduces the number of detected boxes. The output
of Faster R-CNN will be the classification for the detected boxes, {g1, g2, . . . , gN}
where gi indicates the predicted class for hi. gi is a K-length vector consisting
of the predicted probability for the K classes.
Chen et al. [5] proposed both targeted and non-targeted attacks on Faster
R-CNN, in the white-box setting, but only for stop sign images. They selected
stop signs due to security-related issues in the real world, e.g. self-driving cars.
They added perceptible perturbations to make their adversarial samples robust
after printing. Very recently, Huang et al. [34] targeted stop signs, but by
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adding perceptible perturbations around the border of the signs. In contrast,
we target a random set of different objects for both targeted and non-targeted
attacks. We add imperceptible perturbations to fool Faster R-CNN.
Xie et al. [4] proposed a non-targeted attack on Faster R-CNN in the white-
box setting. They added imperceptible perturbations to all pixels in the input
image to change the classes for all detected objects. Here, for the adversar-
ial image, the RPN usually generates a different set of bounding boxes, with
different scales. The bounding boxes change because adding the perturbations
can change their confidence levels. In this work, they change the upper bound
of detected boxes from 300 to 3000 to ensure that the transfer of classification
error among nearby boxes. In contrast, in our Pick-Object-Attack, we do
not increase the upper bound of number of boxes and only add imperceptible
perturbations to the boxes corresponding to a targeted object to change its pre-
dicted class. We do not change the pixel values of other boxes. Unlike Xie et
al. [4], we study both targeted and non-targeted attacks.
3. Method
3.1. Faster R-CNN Model
We evaluate our attack method against Faster R-CNN with ResNet-101, pre-
trained on the ImageNet dataset [35], then trained on the object and attribute
instances of the Visual Genome dataset [9]. The model leads to the state-of-
the-art on different tasks like image captioning and visual question answering
[6] in addition to generating a high object detection performance. Previous
works [4, 5] studied attacking Faster R-CNN trained on the COCO dataset
[8] having only 80 object classes. In comparison, the Visual Genome dataset
has 1600 object classes. It includes 3.8M object instances while the COCO
dataset includes 1.5M object instances. It also contains 2.8M attributes and
2.3M relationships.
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3.2. PICK-OBJECT-ATTACK
Let Iorg denote the original image. Let N be the number of bounding boxes
and K be the number of classes. An object detector can be mathematically ex-
pressed as a function f : I −→ (g, h) where g ∈ RN×K denotes the probability
distribution for N bounding boxes, and h ∈ RN×4 denotes the predicted coor-
dinates of the bounding boxes. Let opick denote the selected object to attack
and a ⊆ {1, 2, .., N} denote the indexes of the boxes with predicted class opick
for the image Iorg. Faster R-CNN rescales the input image so that the shortest
size is 600 pixels. Given the original image Iorg of shape s, our proposed attack
generates an adversarial image Iadv of the same shape. For an image I, we
denote the rescaled image (with the shortest side being 600) by I ′.
Mask Detection. As mentioned before, our proposed attack aims to change the
label of a targeted object opick. To do so, for each attack, we prepare a binary
mask denoted by M which has a same shape as Iorg. M is 1 for bounding boxes
with predicted label opick and is 0 otherwise.
For a loss function L and an image I ′ (obtained by rescaling image I), we
obtain ∇′I′L during the backward pass given by
∇′I′L = r∇I′L (1)
where r is the learning rate and ∇I′L is the gradient of loss L for image I ′.
We resize the gradient ∇′I′L and apply the mask M according to the following
equation
∇IL = M  rescale(∇′I′L, s) (2)
where  denotes bitwise multiplication. For the proposed attack, we use the
final obtained gradient ∇IL for updating image I. We explain the loss functions
for both the non-targeted and targeted attacks below.
Non-Targeted Attack. Our goal in the non-targeted attack is to generate an
image Iadv so that none of the detected boxes have the predicted class opick. To
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Algorithm 1: Non-Tar-Confident/ Non-Tar-Frequent
Input:Iorg, r,maxiter, opick
Output:Iadv
Get mask M from Iorg and opick
success← False
I ← Iorg
for j ← 1 to maxiter do
Compute a for image I
if a = ∅ then
success← True
break
Compute loss L using equation 3
Compute ∇IL using equation 2
I ← I +∇IL
Truncate image I in the range [0, 255]
end for
Iadv ← I
return Iadv
achieve this, we use the following loss function, L given by
L = −
∑
a∈a
log(ga,opick) (3)
where gi,j denotes the predicted probability of the j
th class for the ith box. The
proposed attack modifies the image I, via gradient-ascent, using the gradient,
∇IL. We have two variants: one attacks the most confident object (opick is the
most confident object) called Non-Tar-Confident and another one attacks
the most frequent object (opick is the most frequent object) called Non-Tar-
Frequent. These are the most challenging setups: choosing a low-confidence
or less-frequent object would make it easier to induce a misclassification. These
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attacks run for maxiter iterations for a fixed r, and the attack is considered
unsuccessful if we fail to achieve the goal. Algorithm 1 summarizes our non-
targeted attack.
Algorithm 2: Tar-Confident/ Tar-Frequent
Input:Iorg, r,maxiter, opick, k
Output:Iadv
Get mask M from Iorg and opick
success← False
I ← Iorg
for j ← 1 to maxiter do
Compute a for image I
if a = ∅ then
a = arg max
u
gu,k where u are set of
predicted boxes with positive IoU with mask M
if k = arg max
c
ga,c for any a ∈ a and
opick 6= arg max
c
ga,c for all a ∈ a then
success← True
break
Compute loss L using equation 4
Compute ∇IL using equation 2
I ← I −∇′IL
Truncate image I in the range [0, 255]
end for
Iadv ← I
return Iadv
Targeted Attack. Our goal in the targeted attack is to generate an image Iadv
so that none of the detected boxes have the predicted class opick and some of
the boxes have the predicted class k. Here, k denotes the targeted class for the
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selected object opick. To achieve this, we use the following loss function, L given
by
L = −
∑
a∈a
log(ga,k) (4)
where gi,j denotes the predicted probability of the j
th class for the ith box.
The proposed attack modifies the image I, via gradient-descent, using the gra-
dient, ∇IL. Similar to the non-targeted attack, we have two variants: Tar-
Confident and Tar-Frequent. These attacks run for maxiter iterations for
a fixed r, and the attack is considered unsuccessful if our goal is not achieved.
Algorithm 2 summarizes our targeted attack. During the attack, if there are no
boxes with label opick, we set a to be the box having the maximum probability
of k among all the boxes having a positive Intersection over Union (IoU) with
the mask M .
4. Evaluation Setup
4.1. Intrinsic Evaluation
For intrinsic evaluation, we study the success of the attacks against Faster
R-CNN, and the magnitude of changes to the images caused by the attacks. In
this section, we discuss metrics used to measure the effectiveness of the proposed
attacks and the implementation details where the values of the hyperparameters
are specified.
4.1.1. Metrics
Success Rate. We use success rate defined as the percentage of attacks that suc-
cessfully generate adversarial examples. This is a common metric for evaluating
adversarial attacks (higher means better performance).
ACAC and ACTC. We adapt these measures for object detectors from attacks
against classifiers [27]. For the non-targeted attacks, Average Confidence of
True Class (ACTC) is calculated for object class opick for all predicted boxes
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with positive IoU with the mask. This is a performance metric measuring the
success of the attack methods to escape from opick (lower means better per-
formance). For the targeted attacks, Average Confidence of Adversarial Class
(ACAC) is calculated for object class k for all predicted boxes with label k. This
shows the confidence of the attack methods to generate k (higher means better
performance).
Perceptibility. To quantify the perceptibility of change in image, we follow pre-
vious work [2, 13, 4] in calculating a score δ for an adversarial perturbation
given by
δi =
‖Ii,adv − Ii,org‖2∑
Mi
(5)
where Ii,adv is the i
th adversarial image, Ii,org is the i
th original image, and Mi
is the mask of the ith image in pixels. We normalize the `2 norm of the image
difference by the size of the mask, as our proposed attack adds noise only inside
the mask and the size of the mask varies across images (lower means better
performance).
The Structural SIMilarity (SSIM). We calculate the Structural SIMilarity (SSIM)
to measure the similarity between the original image and the adversarial example
since it is a metric which correlates well with human perception. The definition
of SSIM(Iorg, Iadv) between a single original image Iorg and an adversarial sam-
ple Iadv is given in [36]. We calculate the mean SSIM across all pairs of original
and adversarial images (higher means better performance).
mAP. Mean average precision (mAP) is calculated for objects outside the mask
M . The high value of mAP signifies that other objects outside the mask were
detected correctly. mAP is calculated using original prediction as ground truth
(higher means better performance).
4.1.2. Implementation Details
We test our proposed attack on a set of 1000 images randomly selected from
the validation set of the MSCOCO dataset [8]. For the targeted attacks, we run
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attacks for 10 randomly chosen objects (k) per image resulting in 10k samples.
We fix the learning rate in equation 1 (r) to 10k and set the maximum of
iterations (maxiter) to 60. The source code will be made publicly available.
4.2. Extrinsic Evaluation
We are also interested in seeing how detectable the adversarial changes are
in a downstream task: perturbations might be difficult for a human to detect in
an image but can be very obvious from distortions in the downstream task. We
consider image captioning as our downstream task: captions that are completely
unlike the original ones could make manipulation obvious. We use the image
captioner of Anderson et al. [6], which uses an attention mechanism to attend to
the bounding boxes obtained using Faster R-CNN to generate the caption, and
gives the state-of-the-art results. We investigate how much our Pick-Object-
Attack changes captions compared to an object detection attack that modifies
the entire image, like that of Xie et al. [4]. We note here that our goal differs
from image captioning attacks like that of Chen et al. [16]. Their goal is to
force the captioner to generate specific terms, whereas we just use the image
captioner to measure downstream perceptibility of object detection attacks.
4.2.1. Metrics
The standard image captioning metrics (BLEU [37], METEOR [38], CIDEr
[39], ROUGE [40] and SPICE [41]): these are used to compare generated
captions with human-produced reference captions, and higher scores indicate
greater overlap with these reference captions. We will use these slightly differ-
ently. Here, we are interested in the overlap of the caption for the adversarial
image and the caption for the original image, used as the reference caption. A
higher score means that the two captions are more similar, i.e. the caption for
the adversarial image is less distorted. In addition, we calculate the percentage
of cases for which the proposed attacks can remove the keyword corresponding
to opick from the adversarial caption when the keyword is present in the original
caption (KWR).
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Algorithm 3: Non-Tar-All
Input:Iorg, r,maxiter
Output:Iadv
corg ← set of predicted classes for Iorg
Randomly select class z /∈ corg
success← False
I ← Iorg
for j ← 1 to maxiter do
if arg max
c
gb,c /∈ corg for all boxes b then
success← True
break
L← −∑b log(gb,z)
∇IL← rescale(∇′I′L, s)
I ← I −∇IL
Truncate image I in the range [0, 255]
end for
Iadv ← I
return Iadv
4.2.2. Implementation Details
As a comparison to our Pick-Object-Attack, we design a non-targeted
attack against all objects based on Xie et al. [4]. We choose a fixed label
for all the boxes and do gradient descent until none of the original objects are
detected (Algorithm 3). We name this attack Non-Tar-All. We use the same
learning rate as our previous attacks for a fair comparison and increase maxiter
to 120. Since attacking all objects is a difficult task, we obtained a low success
rate for Non-Tar-All (targeted attack against all objects is not feasible). We
generate captions using three non-targeted attacks: Non-Tar-All, Non-Tar-
Frequent, Non-Tar-Confident and two targeted attacks: Tar-Frequent,
Tar-Confident. To do so, we use 100 successful adversarial examples for the
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Table 1: Success Rate (SR), ACAC, ACTC and mAP for different proposed attacks.
APPROACHES SR ACAC ACTC mAP
Tar-Frequent 89.90% 26.55% 86.09%
Tar-Confident 76.97% 24.53% 91.97%
Non-Tar-Frequent 95.30% 1.25% 94.20%
Non-Tar-Confident 98.40% 2.59% 95.47%
non-targeted attacks for a shared set having 100 images. We use 1000 successful
adversarial examples for the targeted attacks for the shared set (10 per image).
5. Results
5.1. Intrinsic Evaluation
Quantitative Results. Table 1 shows the success rate, ACAC and ACTC for our
variants of the Pick-Object-Attack. Generally, the non-targeted attacks are
more successful compared to the targeted ones. Since we only need to induce
a misclassification for the non-targeted attacks, we can achieve a better success
rate. Tar-Confident has the lowest success rate. For Tar-Confident, out of
2303 unsuccessful attacks, 1750 attacks are unsuccessful since Tar-Confident
cannot find any bounding box with a positive IoU with the mask. This never
happens for Tar-Frequent since the mask is larger for the most frequent
object in comparison with the most confident one in the image. Out of the
cases where there is a bounding box with positive IoU with the mask for Tar-
Confident, the success rate is 93.30%. Non-Tar-Confident generates the
highest success rate since it does not face this condition. ACAC and ACTC
show that the attack approaches can generate high confidence for adversarial
and low confidence for original classes. Similar to Xie et al. [4], we randomly
permute the perturbations generated by the proposed attacks for the adversarial
images. This leads to near zero success rates for all attacks showing that the
spatial structure of the perturbations plays a major role in fooling Faster R-CNN
rather than the magnitude of the perturbations.
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Table 2: Mean and standard deviation, for the successful cases, of δ and SSIM between original
and adversarial images.
APPROACHES
δ
SSIM
MEAN STD. DEV.
Tar-Frequent 1.53× 10−3 1.41× 10−3 98.53%
Tar-Confident 1.06× 10−2 2.82× 10−2 98.73%
Non-Tar-Frequent 6.62× 10−4 8.97× 10−4 99.22%
Non-Tar-Confident 6.65× 10−3 1.58× 10−2 99.32%
Table 1 also shows the mAP metric for our proposed attacks. The proposed
attacks add perturbations only inside the mask with the purpose of preserving
the labels of the bounding boxes outside the mask. However, this perturbation
may lead to a different set of bounding boxes by the region proposal network
(RPN). These bounding boxes are more likely to have a positive IoU with the
mask. Here, mAP shows the impact of perturbation on the bounding boxes out-
side the mask. As shown in Table 1, the proposed attacks mostly do not change
the bounding boxes since they generate high mAP values. These results demon-
strate that there are two factors impacting on the mAP: the number of pertur-
bations and the size of the mask. Our targeted attacks add more perturbations
to images to fool Faster R-CNN to detect targeted classes and they have lower
values for the mAP in comparison with the non-targeted attacks. The attacks
against the most frequent objects (Tar-Frequent and Non-Tar-Frequent)
also generate lower mAP than the most confident objects (Tar-Confident
and Non-Tar-Confident) since the size of the mask for the frequent objects
is larger than the confident objects.
As shown in Table 2, SSIM is high for all attack approaches. This shows
that the approaches are successful in adding imperceptible perturbations to
images (the perturbations are shown in the supplementary material). Table 2
also shows the mean and standard deviation, for successful cases, of δ. Tar-
Confident generates the highest δ. Similarly, Non-Tar-Confident has more
δ in comparison with Non-Tar-Frequent. This means that attacking the
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Table 3: Success Rate for our proposed attacks after resizing the adversarial images with
different scales: 0.6, 0.8, 1.2 and 1.4.
APPROACHES
Scale
0.6 0.8 1.2 1.4
Tar-Frequent 16.75% 44.70% 72.35% 78.30%
Tar-Confident 11.30% 38.08% 65.72% 74.32%
Non-Tar-Frequent 2.31% 9.76% 26.76% 34.63%
Non-Tar-Confident 14.23% 26.42% 42.78% 52.34%
most confident object is harder than attacking the most frequent object in the
image, even though there are typically more instances of the most frequent
object. In fact, from Table 2, we can see that Non-Tar-Confident requires
more noise than Tar-Frequent.
Table 3 shows the robustness of adversarial images generated using the pro-
posed attacks against resizing with different scales. The targeted attacks are
more robust in comparison with the non-targeted attacks since they add more
perturbations to images to generate particular classes. These results show that
the adversarial images are more robust for bigger scales in comparison with
smaller scales.
Figure 2 shows the histograms of number of boxes and mean probabilities.
The first row includes the histogram of the number of boxes, having the pre-
dicted label as the targeted class (k), with a positive IoU with the mask. It
also includes the histogram of the mean probabilities of the targeted class for
the boxes in the targeted attacks. The second row includes the histogram of
the number of boxes with a positive IoU with the mask. It also includes the
histogram of mean probabilities of the original class (opick) for the boxes in the
non-targeted attacks. This confirms that as expected the total number of boxes
for the frequent object is greater than the confident object. The mean proba-
bility of the targeted class for both Tar-Confident and Tar-Frequent are
almost similar; however, the mean probability of the original class for Non-
Tar-Confident is more than Non-Tar-Frequent.
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Confident Frequent
Targeted
Non-Taregeted
Figure 2: The histograms of number of boxes and mean probabilities for different variants of
Pick-Object-Attack.
Figure 3 shows the histogram of number of iterations. The first row shows
the histogram of the number of iterations for the targeted attacks and the sec-
ond row for the non-targeted attacks. The maximum number of iterations is 60.
If an attack takes 60 iterations, this indicates an unsuccessful attack (we do not
show the unsuccessful attacks for Tar-Confident when there is no bounding
box having a positive IoU with the mask). The histograms show that attacking
the most frequent object requires more iterations in comparison with attacking
the most confident object. This is because attacking the most frequent ob-
ject requires changing the label of more boxes in the image. As expected, the
targeted attacks take more iterations than the non-targeted ones.
Qualitative Results. Consider the pair of images in the upper row of Figure 4.
For generating the adversarial image on the right, we targeted “cat” for “sheep”
in this example. The outputs of Faster R-CNN (the labels of bounding boxes)
18
Confident Frequent
Targeted
Non-Taregeted
Figure 3: The histogram of number of iterations for different variants of Pick-Object-
Attack.
show that “sheep” is changed to “cat”. Similarly, in the lower row, the tar-
geted attack approach successfully changes all instances of “bird” to “sign” as
shown in the labels of bounding boxes. Note that Figure 4 shows only bounding
boxes which are fed to the captioning system. Since the captioning system only
picks the top scoring bounding boxes from Faster R-CNN, we obtain different
bounding boxes for the original and the adversarial images.
5.2. Extrinsic Evaluation
Quantitative Results. Table 4 shows the image captioning metrics for different
attack approaches. Since Non-Tar-All changes the whole image, it generates
the lowest values for the metrics. The differences are quite dramatic: BLEU-1 is
much smaller forNon-Tar-All than for any variant of Pick-Object-Attack;
BLEU-3 is zero for Non-Tar-All which shows that there are zero overlaps of
trigrams (sequences of three words) between perturbed and original captions.
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A sheep laying in the grass next to a tree. A cat is laying down in the grass.
A man sitting on a bench with two birds. A man sitting on a bench with a skateboard.
Figure 4: The first column includes the original images and the second column includes the
adversarial images with their corresponding generated captions. The bounding boxes and the
labels on these images are the outputs of Faster R-CNN.
Table 4: Image captioning metrics and KWR (in %) for different attacks (B-N is BLEU-N).
APPROACHES B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 CIDEr METEOR ROUGE-L SPICE KWR
Non-Tar-All 23.15 6.91 0.00 0.00 5.59 8.19 22.70 0.86
Tar-Frequent 44.77 31.82 24.45 19.58 179.26 20.67 44.03 22.98 72.43
Tar-Confident 57.73 47.57 40.92 35.81 331.74 30.30 57.28 40.19 80.17
Non-Tar-Frequent 63.28 53.23 46.27 40.62 389.55 33.06 62.91 48.16 54.00
Non-Tar-Confident 70.39 62.59 56.98 52.48 495.17 38.03 69.39 57.18 76.00
Comparing our Pick-Object-Attack variants, Tar-Frequent and Non-
Tar-Frequent change more regions in the image because they attack the
most frequent object. Thus, they generate lower values in comparison with
Tar-Confident and Non-Tar-Confident, respectively. The targeted at-
tacks have lower values in comparison with the non-targeted ones since they
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add more perturbations to images to generate particular classes. From these
results, it is evident that fewer changes in the image lead to fewer changes in
the corresponding captions.
In terms of keyword removal (KWR), Tar-Confident and Non-Tar-
Confident have higher values in comparison with Tar-Frequent and Non-
Tar-Frequent since they add more perturbations to change the label of the
most confident object in the image. Tar-Frequent and Tar-Confident have
higher values than their non-targeted versions since they aim to generate a par-
ticular class (since opick is not fixed for Non-Tar-All, we do not provide KWR
for this approach).
To study perceptibility of attack, we calculate mean, standard deviation
of `2-norm of the difference image and SSIM between the adversarial images,
used for the extrinsic evaluation, and the original images. Since Non-Tar-All
modifies the whole image, to compare across attacks, we normalize the `2-norm
of the difference image by the image size for all attacks (we include `2-norm
normalised by mask size, as per Equation 5, for direct comparison with Table 2,
in Table 5).
Table 5: Mean and standard deviation of δ for the captioning examples.
APPROACHES
δ
MEAN STD. DEV.
Tar-Frequent 1.49× 10−3 8.40× 10−4
Tar-Confident 8.37× 10−3 1.85× 10−2
Non-Tar-Frequent 5.52× 10−4 3.35× 10−4
Non-Tar-Confident 4.18× 10−3 8.39× 10−3
As shown in Table 6, all methods generate perturbations with low percepti-
bility. The non-targeted variants of Pick-Object-Attack are less detectable
than the targeted ones; Non-Tar-All is more similar to the targeted vari-
ants of Pick-Object-Attack, although the perturbations are still small. The
perceptibility of Non-Tar-All by these standard metrics, however, contrasts
strongly with the effects on the downstream image captioning task that we
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Table 6: Mean and standard deviation of `2-norm of the difference image normalised by the
image size, and SSIM between original and adversarial images.
APPROACHES
`2-norm
SSIM
MEAN STD. DEV.
Non-Tar-All 1.40× 10−3 3.97× 10−4 98.23%
Tar-Frequent 1.22× 10−3 4.86× 10−4 98.16%
Tar-Confident 1.20× 10−3 4.61× 10−4 98.42%
Non-Tar-Frequent 4.55× 10−4 2.24× 10−4 99.12%
Non-Tar-Confident 4.08× 10−4 2.50× 10−4 99.23%
describe above, suggesting that the evaluation of how detectable adversarial
perturbations are should extend beyond the standard perceptibility metrics.
Qualitative Results. Figure 4 shows two examples fed into the captioning model
(the attention weights of the model for these examples are visualized in the
Figures .7 and .8 in the appendix). The original image in the first row leads
to the caption of “a sheep laying in the grass next to a tree”. As discussed in
§5.1, a targeted attack changes “sheep” to “cat”; the caption is correspondingly
changed to “a cat is laying down in the grass”. This means that our attack
against Faster R-CNN can indirectly attack the captioning model to generate
a different caption with our targeted class (“cat”). This is also true for the
image in the second row for generating a different caption. The original caption
for the image is “a man sitting on a bench with two birds”. As noted in §5.1,
the attack approach successfully changes “bird” to “sign”; the caption for the
adversarial example here is “a man sitting on a bench with a skateboard” which
is different from the original one. Although the attack model leads to a new
caption, the caption does not include our targeted class (“sign”); “skateboard”
is chosen because it is strongly favoured by the language model.
As indicated by Table 4, Non-Tar-All changes captions much more dra-
matically. Table 7 shows examples of predicted captions for adversarial and
original images using different variants of Pick-Object-Attack and Non-
Tar-All. As we can see Non-Tar-All leads to image captions which are
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Table 7: Examples of predicted captions for adversarial and original image using different
attack approaches.
APPROACHES ORIGINAL CAPTIONS ADVERSARIAL CAPTIONS
Non-Tar-All Two stuffed teddy bears sitting on a bed. A blender that is sitting in the water.
A man riding a horse in front of a crowd. A bunch of food on a grill with meat being dogs.
A person holding a hot dog on a bun. A close up view of an airplane with a knife.
Tar-Frequent A donut and a donut sitting on a table. A plate with a doughnut and a donut on it.
A man jumping a skateboard on a skateboard. A man jumping through the air with a skateboard.
Two birds are flying over a building in a city. Two birds sitting on a boat in the water.
Tar-Confident A man riding a horse in front of a crowd. A person riding a horse in front of a dog.
A black and white photo of a city street with cars. A tower with a clock on top of it.
A living room with a table and a table. A man taking a picture in a bathroom mirror.
Non-Tar-Frequent Two cats sitting in a bath tub sink. A black and white dog is standing in a boat.
A black and white photo of a city street with cars. A black and white photo of a city street with cars.
A living room with a table and a table. A living room with a couch and a table.
Non-Tar-Confident A group of people walking around a parking meter. A man is holding a parking meter on a pole.
A television and a television in a room. A living room with a couch and a chair.
A vase with white flowers on a desk. A vase with white flowers on a desk.
entirely unrelated with the original captions such as “A man riding a horse in
front of a crowd” becomes “A bunch of food on a grill with meat being dogs”.
5.3. Visualizing Adversarial Noise
We visualize the amount of noise added to several examples in Figure 5
and 6. As shown, in each example, the noise is added to a region of image
corresponding to the selected object (opick). We did this by defining M (our
binary mask) in Equation 2. For example, the sample objects of “grass” and
“giraffe” are chosen and attacked in the first two rows of Figure 5 by Tar-
Frequent. These objects are the most frequent objects in the corresponding
images and their corresponding masks are bigger than the last two rows in the
figure. They are also successfully changed to “star” and “lion”, respectively.
In the last two rows, the sample objects of “kite” and “skateboard” (the most
confident objects) are attacked in the images by Tar-Confident. They are
changed to “eyes” and “column”, respectively. Moreover, we have shown some
samples of our non-targeted attacks in Figure 6. For example, the sample objects
of “tie” and “bench” are attacked in the first two rows of the figure by Non-
23
Figure 5: Each row contains the original image, adversarial perturbation and the adversarial
image (from left to right). The first two rows are from Tar-Frequent and the last two rows
are from Tar-Confident. We show opick on top of each row. “grass” changes to “star” and
“giraffe” changes to “lion” in the first and second rows, respectively. “kite” changes to “eyes”
and “skateboard” changes to “column” for the third and fourth rows, respectively.
Tar-Frequent. These are the most frequent objects in the images. In the last
two rows, “whiskers” and “light” are attacked by Non-Tar-Confident. These
are the most confident objects in the images. In these non-targeted attacks, we
do not target any specific class and the most frequent objects usually come with
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Figure 6: Each row contains the original image, adversarial perturbation and the adversarial
image (from left to right). The first two rows are from Non-Tar-Frequent and the last two
rows are from Non-Tar-Confident. We show opick on top of each row. For example, “tie”
is opick in the first row.
bigger masks compared to the most confident ones.
6. Conclusion and Future work
We have proposed Pick-Object-Attack, a type-specific adversarial at-
tack for Faster R-CNN, the widely used and high-performing object detector.
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The proposed approach attacks a specific object in an image and aims to pre-
serve the labels of other detected objects in the image. We study both targeted
and non-targeted attacks. For each one, we have two variants: attacking the
most frequent and the most confident object in the image. Amongst them, the
lowest success rate is obtained by the Tar-Confident because this approach
sometimes fails to find bounding boxes within the mask. The results show
that attacking the most confident object requires more noise than the most
frequent object. The proposed attacks achieve high mAP values for bounding
boxes outside the mask which shows that they preserve the labels of other de-
tected objects. In addition to standard perceptibility metrics, we carried out
an extrinsic evaluation to study the impact of the adversarial images on the
state-of-the-art image captioning system. We compared the captions generated
by different variants of Pick-Object-Attack with a baseline attack adapted
from [4] that modifies the entire image. The results show that although all
models produce perturbations with low perceptibility, the baseline attack pro-
duces dramatically distorted captions, in contrast with Pick-Object-Attack,
suggesting that extrinsic evaluation on downstream tasks would be a useful
complement to standard perceptibility measures.
As a part of future work, we plan to explore the impact of our attacks
against other downstream tasks such as visual question answering (VQA). We
also aim to study the more challenging task of attacking attributes as well as
objects detected by Faster R-CNN, simultaneously. This might be a difficult
scenario since it is relatively straightforward for an object detector to learn a
set of attributes corresponding to a specific object.
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Appendix
Figure .7: The attention visualization for the caption of the original image (the top image)
and the adversarial image (the bottom image). The adversarial image was obtained by Tar-
Confident and the original class was “sheep” (opick). In this example, the caption of the
adversarial image includes the targeted class, “cat” (k).
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Figure .8: The attention visualization for the caption of the original image (the top image)
and the adversarial image (the bottom image). The adversarial image was obtained by Tar-
Frequent and the original class was “bird” (opick). In this example, the caption of the
adversarial image does not include the targeted class, “sign” (k).
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